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THE ISCIP ANALYST 
Volume 2, Number 1 (January 22, 1997) 
 
Russian Federation: Executive Branch and Security 
Services 
By Susan Cavan 
 
PRESIDENCY 
Yel'tsin illness sparks constitutional debate 
As the Kremlin announcements of Yel'tsin's current health woes evolved from the 
flu to pneumonia, the State Duma debated the procedure for declaring the 
President incapacitated. Initiated by the Communist faction in the Duma, a 
resolution on removing the ailing president was stymied by the Duma's legal 
department. At issue is the vague wording of Article 92 of the Constitution, which 
describes the replacement of the president due to incapacitation. The 
Constitution does not stipulate who should determine the capability of the 
President to perform his duties. The Duma's resolution to remove the ailing 
President was evidently viewed as an attempt to amend the Constitution. The 
head of the Federation Council's Committee of Constitutional Legislation and 
Legal Issues, Vladimir Platonov, said on January 16th that a law defining the 
constitutional amendment process must be written before such a resolution could 
be considered. 
 
While the current controversy over the president's ability to govern may soon be 
resolved by Yel'tsin's return to the Kremlin, the constitutional debate it has 
sparked is likely to haunt the executive branch. The Russian Constitution, written 
after the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet in 1993, highlights the role of 
presidential power and seems specifically designed for the current leadership. 
While in the past the Federation Council may have been more inclined to 
negotiate with the Kremlin, recent elections may embolden the regional leaders 
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to join with the Duma in calls for changes to the constitutional balance of 
branches. Once again, Yel'tsin's initiatives upon his return to work may be crucial 
in determining the relations between executive and legislative branches of 
government. Expect personnel changes. 
 
SECURITY COUNCIL 
Romancing the Cossacks 
The idea of creating separate Cossack units is once again on the agenda. With 
the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya and the uncertainty of 
upcoming elections, Cossack leaders are demanding guarantees for Russians 
residing in the north of the republic. Deputy Secretary of the Security Council 
Boris Berezovsky recently announced support for the idea of arming separate 
Cossack units. His comments were soon contradicted by Secretary of the 
Security Council Ivan Rybkin, who opposed arming Cossack units, suggesting 
instead that they could be integrated into the Armed Forces. Interior Minister 
Anatoli Kulikov also opposed the arming of Cossack units, and instead stated 
that if the interests of ethnic Russians living in Chechnya were not protected 
following the troop withdrawal, Russia could again send in troops. 
 
Although the participants in the Security Council debate seem unaware, there is 
already a presidential department tasked with coordinating Cossack affairs. The 
Cossack Troops Main Department (CTMD) under the president was created in 
January 1996 in accordance with a presidential decree. Headed by Anatoli 
Semenov, the CTMD recently released its first news bulletin, in which it detailed 
its work "on the transformation of Cossack troops into military structures entitled 
to a state service." (TASS, 8 January 1997) Various departments in the 
presidential administration, the Defense Ministry, the Interior Ministry, the Federal 
Border Guards Service, and the Nationalities Ministry are all involved in the work 
of the CTMD. 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
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By Chandler Rosenberger  
 
EAST AND CENTRAL EUROPE 
Anti-NATO stance taken by Rodinov, Yel'tsin, but dismissed by Primakov  
Russian Defense Minster Igor Rodionov blasted NATO's plans to expand 
eastward after meeting with defense ministers from the 16 NATO countries on 18 
December, international agencies reported. Rodionov dismissed alliance pledges 
not to deploy nuclear weapons in new member states, saying such promises 
could be revoked at any time. He renewed threats to take unspecified 
"countermeasures" if the alliance expands and said expansion would threaten 
START II. (OMRI Daily Digest I, No. 244, 19 Dec 96). Addressing a Moscow 
conference on CIS military cooperation on 25 December, Russian Defense 
Minster Igor Rodionov said that Washington's efforts to "make its world 
leadership complete" by relying on an expanded NATO may become a "military 
threat" to Russia and other CIS states, Russian and Western agencies reported. 
(OMRI Daily Digest I, No. 246, 30 Dec 1996). 
 
After meeting with Yel'tsin on 4 January, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl 
admitted that "some differences" divide Bonn and Moscow on NATO 
enlargement, but he expressed the hope that a mutually acceptable compromise 
solution would be found this year. Yel'tsin's spokesman, Sergei Yastrzhembsky, 
later said that the Russian president had laid out Russian objections to 
enlargement "fairly toughly." (OMRI Daily Digest I, No. 3, 6 Jan 97) Two days 
later Yel'tsin directed Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov to devise a flexible 
"action plan" of various measures which Russia might take if the alliance accepts 
new Eastern European members. (OMRI Daily Digest I, No. 4, 7 Jan 97) 
 
But German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel on 8 January interpreted the latest 
Russian denunciations of the alliance's expansion plans as bargaining ploys, 
saying "Russia knows that it cannot prevent NATO expansion and wants to 
obtain a good price for it." (OMRI Daily Digest I, No. 5, 8 Jan 97) 
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At a meeting of the Russian government the next day, Primakov appeared to 
justify Kinkel's assessment. Primakov cited the December 1996 NATO statement 
that the alliance has no intention of deploying nuclear weapons in new East 
European members as evidence that firm Russian opposition to NATO 
expansion was delivering results. He described the pledge as "insufficient," 
however, adding that Russia would use NATO's approach to planned talks on 
revising the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty to evaluate 
whether the alliance was serious about negotiating a substantive Russia-NATO 
charter. (OMRI Daily Digest I, No. 6, 9 Jan 97) 
 
But does Russia want Belarus or the Baltics in exchange? 
Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov told a meeting of the Russian government on 
9 January that Moscow "should not be afraid to use economic sanctions" to 
defend the human rights of Russians living in the Baltic states, Russian and 
Western agencies reported. In order to pressure Estonia into halting what he 
claimed are discriminatory policies toward its Russian minority, for example, he 
said that Moscow will refuse to sign a border treaty with Tallinn until the issue 
was resolved. (OMRI Daily Digest I, No. 7, 10 Jan 97). 
 
Belarusian President Lukashenka hailed Yel'tsin's move [to integrate Belarus into 
the Russia], as did Russian communist politicians. Lukashenka said accelerated 
integration "is our baby, mine and the Russian president's." CIS Affairs Minister 
Aman Tuleev, the only opposition representative in Yel'tsin's cabinet, called 
Yel'tsin's move "the only real step to counter NATO" yet taken by Moscow. 
(OMRI Daily Digest I, No. 9, 14 Jan 97). 
 
Who are Russia's enemies? What are her interests?  
Addressing a Moscow conference on CIS military cooperation on 25 December, 
Russian Defense Minster Igor Rodionov said that Washington's efforts to "make 
its world leadership complete" by relying on an expanded NATO may become a 
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"military threat" to Russia and other CIS states, Russian and Western agencies 
reported. Rodionov added that Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Japan, China, and other 
unnamed Asian countries also pose potential military threats. He urged the 
formation of joint CIS military forces and the bolstering of Russian strategic 
nuclear forces in response. The Russian Foreign Ministry quickly moved to 
downplay Rodionov's remarks, labeling his list of potential adversaries "purely 
hypothetical." (OMRI Daily Digest I, No. 246, 30 Dec 1996). 
 
In an interview with ITAR- TASS on 8 January marking his first year as foreign 
minister, Yevgeni Primakov said Moscow aims for "equal partnership" with its 
partners around the globe, and he emphasized that he wanted to steer a middle 
course between the extremes of Soviet-style anti-Westernism and what he 
termed the romantic pro-Western approach of his predecessor, Andrei Kozyrev. 
Using a favorite theme, he said the emerging multipolar world order gave 
Russian diplomacy room for maneuver, and he lauded Russian successes during 
1996 in building ties with China and pushing forward with CIS integration. (OMRI 
Daily Digest I, No. 6, 9 Jan 97). 
 
Comment 
There seems to be a substantial split between the defense and foreign ministries 
on who Russia's enemies are. While ideologues such as Rodionov may 
instinctively object to the expansion of NATO, the (more dangerous) pragmatists 
such as Primakov seem to be playing the NATO expansion game for other 
prizes, such as: 
• increased arms trading to China, and others 
• sanction of Russian involvement in Iran's nuclear industry 
• a larger number of troops Russia would like to place near the Baltics. 
 
Should the West instead accept integration of Belarus as a chit in negotiations, 
the Russians would end up agreeing to expansion in exchange for the 'right' to 
carry a state that is in any case collapsing into its arms. Other concessions would 
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simply allow Russia to continue to use what Primakov himself has admitted is 
nothing more than a bargaining chip, one that expands with every Western 
capitulation. 
 
FAR EAST 
Li Peng in Moscow: another chit in NATO negotiations? 
China's Li Peng met President Yel'tsin and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin 
during his 26-28 December official visit. The two countries issued a joint 
communique hailing the "huge potential" of bilateral cooperation and pledging to 
build an "equal and reliable partnership." Several bilateral agreements were also 
signed, covering nuclear-power-plant construction, central-bank cooperation, and 
finalizing the sale of SU-27 fighters and related production technology to China. 
Segodnya on 28 December noted that warming Russian-Chinese ties were 
intended as Moscow's "answer to the United States" in response to such 
Western policies as NATO enlargement. (OMRI Daily Digest I, No. 246, 30 Dec 
1996). 
 
SOUTH WEST AND SOUTH ASIA 
Russia in Iran's nuclear industry?  
Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov met with his Iranian counterpart, Ali 
Akbar Velayati, and Iranian President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani during his two-
day visit to Tehran on 22-23 December, international agencies reported. After 
signing a memorandum of understanding on nuclear export control with Velayati, 
Primakov said the two countries adhere to "internationally accepted norms," and 
that "no one can condemn" their cooperation in this area, which includes plans to 
finish an incomplete nuclear power station at Bushehr in southern Iran. (OMRI 
Daily Digest I, No. 246, 30 Dec 1996) 
 
Russia sells Greek Cypriots air defense systems  
Cypriot officials and a Rosvooruzhenie delegation concluded a contract for the 
delivery of S-300 air defense missile systems on 4 January, international 
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agencies reported. The number of missiles involved and the exact value of the 
deal was not revealed by either side, nor has a delivery date been specified. 
Unconfirmed Cypriot sources suggest Nicosia has purchased 20 missile systems 
for $660 million. 
 
Russian Federation: Regional Elections and 
Legislative Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
 
REGIONAL ELECTIONS 
Head of KomiPermyak district administration reelected 
About 70% of the voters who took part in the elections on 18 November 1996 for 
the head of Komi Permyak autonomous district administration, in the Urals, 
supported the incumbent leader Nikolay Poluyanov. 
 
Communist elected in Stavropol 
Aleksandr Chernogorov, a Communist member of the State Duma, was elected 
governor of Stavropol territory, southern Russia. 55.06% of voters cast their 
ballots for Chernogorov in the second round of voting. His rival, the incumbent 
governor Petr Marchenko representing Our Home is Russia movement was 
backed by 40.14%. 
 
Incumbent wins in Komi 
On 18 November 1996 incumbent Governor Nikolay Poluyanov won provincial 
elections in the Komi Permyatsk autonomous area with some 70% of the vote. 
His main rival, chairman of the Constitutional Party Anatoli Fedoseyev got only 
17 percent of votes. 
 
First woman elected in Koryak 
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Jurist Valentina Broniyevich, a 40-year-old native of the Koryak Autonomous 
Okrug and former chairman of the okrug executive committee, has become the 
first woman who will head the administration of this autonomous territory in the 
north of the Kamchatka Peninsula. According to preliminary data, she secured 
more than 46 percent of the votes. 
 
FEDERAL ASSEMBLY 
Duma recommends moratorium on capital punishment 
Russian State Duma recommended to the Federation Council a moratorium on 
capital punishment. The authors of the bill reiterated Russia's intention to impose 
a moratorium on carrying out executions when it joined the Council of Europe. 
The lawmakers proposed to suspend all death penalties until the adoption of a 
law on capital punishment. According to a report read at the debate, a total of 
238 people were sentenced to death in Russia last year. Of those, 40 were 
executed. 
 
Russian Federation: Chechnya 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
Polling places for refugees from Chechnya 
Those who have been displaced by the war number 350,000 and constitute more 
than 50% of Chechnya's electorate. The arrangements by which they would be 
allowed to vote have been a source of contention between Moscow (which 
favored setting up polling places throughout the country including Moscow, St. 
Petersburg, Volgograd and other Russian cities where Chechens reside), and 
Grozny (which sought to accommodate the refugees by busing them to their 
former homes). At their meeting in December, Rybkin and Maskhadov agreed to 
allow displaced people who have been forced to flee Chechnya to vote in districts 
of Dagestan, Ingushetia and Stavropol that border Chechnya (TASS, 26 Dec 
1996). However, the final arrangement as described by Tim Guldimann, the head 
of the OSCE mission in Chechnya which is monitoring the elections, are as the 
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Chechens originally intended; returning voters are to register in their home 
districts. (Interfax, 10 Jan 1997) This procedure is certain to attract fewer of the 
displaced people than allowing them to vote in Russia would have, and (unless a 
candidate that Moscow favors is elected) may leave the election open to claims 
of unfairness. 
 
A second provocatsia on election eve?  
Chechen First Vice Premier Udugov accused General Shevtsov, ataman of the 
Cossacks, of plotting the deaths of ethnic Russian families which would be 
blamed on the Chechens to substantiate Cossack initiatives for separating the 
Naurskiy and Shelkovskiy rayons from Chechnya. (Komsomolskaya Pravda, 14 
Jan 1997) This comes on the heels of the departure of the last Russian 
detachment on 5 January, 1997 and the renewal of calls for arming Cossack 
civilians, (TASS, 13 Jan 1997) forming Cossack detachments (See Security 
Council above) and an earlier murder of humanitarian personnel working in 
Grozny for the Red Cross. Suspects held in connection with that grisly affair, 
which was intended to keep international observers away from the polls in 
Chechnya, are members of the Confederation of the Peoples of the North 
Caucasus, a group led by Yusup Soslambekov, a presidential candidate in the 
Chechen election. (OMRI, 31 Dec 1996) 
 
Recognition in sight? 
The Chechen information centers which were organized during the war, 
particularly the ones in Krakow and Warsaw, have prompted angry outburst from 
Russian politicians. On 26 December, the Polish Ambassador Andrej Zalucki, 
told Primakov that the Polish authorities dissociate themselves from the 
decisions of the city councils to permit the operation of the centers. He also told 
Primakov that the centers would not be transformed into embassies of an 
independent Chechnya. (Interfax, 26 December 1996) Although no country has 
yet recognized Chechnya, Primakov warned the Security Council on January 9 
that it is possible that "Chechnya, de-facto and de-jure, will secede from Russia," 
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and "the main task facing the Russian government now is to place shock 
absorbers on this path in advance." (Interfax, 9 January 1997) 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By CDR John G. Steele 
 
Russian military woes continue 
Rodionov continues to warn of Army's impoverishment. Proposed reductions to a 
manning level of 1 million (from current level of 1.5 million) are described as 
"totally unrealistic" and the 1997 budget is inadequate to support proposed (but 
ill-defined) reform efforts. 
 
Moscow military procurators have filed suit against the Defense Ministry for wage 
arrears. Sources put the current wage backlog at about 6 trillion rubles. 
 
The latest in a series of fatal plane crashes (attributed to poor maintenance and 
lack of funding) claimed the lives of seventeen, including the commander of the 
Leningrad Military district and his wife. 
 
The Russians have agreed to sell S-300 (a very capable surface to air missile 
system) to the Greek Cypriot government. The deal is reportedly worth $400 
million. The Turks are (to put it mildly) not happy about it. 
 
Georgia apologizes for ship seizure by Russians 
Georgia apologized to the Ukraine for the actions of Russian naval forces based 
in Georgia. Shevardnadze stated the Russian seizure of the Ukrainian ship 
"amounted to piracy." 
 
Black Sea Fleet base status examined 
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The Federation Council called upon Yel'tsin to halt any agreements concerning 
the status of Sevastopol until a special commission determines the status of the 
main naval base in the city. 
 
Charges against Nikitin are dropped 
The Russian prosecutor general followed up on the earlier release of Nikitin, and 
dropped the charges of treason against him, though Kovalev (head of FSB) 
maintains the opinion that Nikitin actually conducted espionage. In January 
Nikitin's wife suffered some harassment at the hands of Russian border officials 
when she traveled to and from Norway. 
 
INTERNATIONAL NEWS 
NATO expansion discussed 
Yel'tsin and Kohl discussed NATO enlargement, and NATO chief Solana traveled 
to Russia and spoke to Primakov on the same topic. The Russians are 
increasingly adamant that NATO expansion be halted or that they be afforded an 
increased role in the alliance. The Russians and Chinese signed an agreement 
to allow the Chinese to produce the SU-27 jet fighters. The Russians stipulated 
that aircraft eventually produced under the deal are not to be exported to third 
parties. The two countries also signed an agreement to limit border troops on 
their frontier. 
 
Russian troops leave Chechnya 
On 5 January the Russians announced officially that all Russian forces had left 
Chechnya. 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Chandler Rosenberger 
 
BELARUS 
Belarus suspended from Council of Europe  
 12 
The Council of Europe suspended Belarus's special guest status in the 
organization on 13 January, international agencies reported. Council President 
Leni Fischer said the new Belarusian constitution does not respect human rights. 
The Council will also refuse to recognize the new Belarusian parliament, which 
was convened after president Lukashenka forced through passage of the new 
constitution. (OMRI Daily Digest II, No. 9, 14 Jan 97) 
 
Belarus' president cleans house  
President Alyaksandr Lukashenka has appointed Piotr Prakapovich first deputy 
prime minister, Belarusian radio reported. Prakapovich, an economist, is 
considered a moderate. He will be responsible for implementing the 
government's socio-economic development program until the year 2000. (OMRI 
Daily Digest II, No. 2, 3 Jan 1997) 
 
Lukashenka also issued a decree dismissing Uladzimir Syanko from the post of 
foreign minister, and appointing Ivan Antonovich in his place, international 
agencies reported on 11 January. The same day, Lukashenka confirmed acting 
Defense Minister Alyaksandr Chumakau in his post. Chumakau replaced Leanid 
Maltseu last year after Maltseu was unceremoniously dismissed for appearing 
drunk at a banquet. (OMRI Daily Digest II, No. 8, 13 Jan 97) 
 
Comment  
While President Alyaksandr Lukashenka has taken some heat from foreign 
governments for his crackdown on the Parliament, his new administration seems 
composed on the basis of loyalty rather than ideology. 
 
UKRAINE 
Sevastopol new launchpad to the Russian Presidency? 
The Russian Federation Council called on President Boris Yel'tsin on 26 
December to impose a moratorium on agreements on the Black Sea Fleet until a 
special commission examines the status of the main base, Sevastopol, NTV 
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reported. The following day, Moscow Mayor Yurii Lushkov informed Ukraine's 
Foreign Ministry that he intends to visit the city in January, despite the ministry's 
threats to declare him persona non grata to prevent such a visit, Rossiskaya 
gazeta reported. (OMRI Daily Digest II, No. 246, 30 Dec 1996). 
 
Ukraine budget deficit twice as high as forecast -- corruption a factor?  
Ukraine's budget deficit in 1996 totaled 8.6 billion hryvnyas ($4.57 billion), 
Reuters reported on 31 December. That is double the figure forecast when the 
budget was drawn up. Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko said that GDP fell for the 
fifth consecutive year and that, according to the most optimistic forecasts, it is not 
expected to reach the 1990 level for another 11 years. (OMRI Daily Digest II, No. 
1, 2 Jan 1997) Meanwhile, World Bank President James Wolfenson sent a letter 
to President Leonid Kuchma at the beginning of the year criticizing corruption 
within the Ukrainian government, Ukrainian Radio reported on 8 January. Deputy 
Prime Minister Viktor Pynzenyk admitted that the problem of government 
corruption exists, noting that international criticism has begun because of 
increased foreign investment in the country. (OMRI Daily Digest II, No. 6, 9 Jan 
97) 
 
Splits in Moldova cause of worry over splits in Ukraine?  
The eastern region of Kharkiv voted to give the Russian language equal status 
with Ukrainian as of the beginning of the year, ITAR-TASS reported on 7 
January. At the same time, the administration in the predominantly Russian-
speaking eastern region of Donetsk took the opposite position, deciding that the 
official language in the region's administration and business would be solely 
Ukrainian. (OMRI Daily Digest II, No. 5, 8 Jan 97) 
 
Meanwhile, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Hennady Udovenko on 6 January said 
that Ukraine "takes the Moldovan side" on the issue of settling the conflict 
between Moldova and its breakaway Dniester region, Western agencies 
reported. The comment was made one day after Moldovan President-elect Petru 
 14 
Lucinschi met Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma in Odessa. (OMRI Daily 
Digest II, No. 4, 7 Jan 97) 
 
Comment  
Five years ago Gen. Alexander Lebed taught all Russian politicians that defense 
of an "embattled" Russian minority beyond the nation's borders made good TV 
clips at home. Moscow Mayor Yuri Lushkov, second only to Lebed in recent 
opinion polls as Russians' choice for Yel'tsin's replacement, seems to have 
picked Ukraine's Crimean Russians to be his stage for a similarly enticing road 
show. Wary of the precedent, Ukraine appears to be strengthening its defense of 
a sovereign Moldova within its borders. Too bad Kiev seems less interested in 
resolving the economic crisis that may well push the Russian-speaking East to 
action. 
 
MOLDOVA 
Lucinschi has trouble finding a successor  
Infotag reported on 19 December that Ion Cebuc, the current chairman of the 
State Accounting Chamber, is the candidate most likely to be designated the 
country's next prime minister. Citing Agrarian Democratic Party of Moldova 
(PDAM) leader Dumitru Motpan, the agency reported that Cebuc's nomination 
was discussed at a recent meeting between President-elect Petru Lucinschi and 
the PDAM leadership. Motpan added that Cebuc has "vast experience" in politics 
and managing the economy, having served at different times as the head of 
Moldova's representation in Moscow, deputy foreign minister, and deputy 
minister of the economy. (OMRI Daily Digest II, No. 245, 20 Dec 96) 
 
And yet for the third time in less than a week, the parliament has failed to elect a 
new speaker, Infotag reported on 14 January. The main contenders to replace 
Petru Lucinschi in that post are Dumitru Motpan, chairman of the ruling Agrarian 
Democratic Party, and Deputy Speaker Dumitru Diacov, a close associate of 
Lucinschi. (OMRI Daily Digest II, No. 10, 15 Jan 97) 
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Smirnov re-elected in Trans-Dniestria  
Igor Smirnov has been re-elected president of the Transdniester breakaway 
region, Infotag reported. He won 71.94% of the vote in elections held on 22 
December. Vladimir Malakhov, the only other candidate, polled 19.84%. At 
57.1%, turnout was the lowest for either elections or referenda held in the 
separatist republic since the proclamation of independence in September 1990. 
Smirnov said he intends to continue working to strengthen Trans-dniestrian 
statehood and wants to keep Russian troops in the region until Tiraspol receives 
"firm guarantees" that the Transdniestrian problem will not be solved by force. 
(OMRI Daily Digest II, No. 246, 30 Dec 1996) 
 
At his inauguration Smirnov was congratulated by Tiraspol officials and blessed 
by the local Orthodox bishop and stated at the ceremony that the creation of the 
secessionist republic has made it more difficult for "Romania to incorporate 
Moldova." He stressed that the future relationship between Chisinau and Tiraspol 
should be based on treaties and that Moldova should "view the Dniester region 
as a [separate] state." (OMRI Daily Digest II, No. 8, 13 Jan 97) 
 
Comment  
Maybe it is possible to have too many friends. With so many would-be 
successors from his own left-leaning alliance to pick from, Lucinschi, Moldova's 
newly-elected president, seems not to be able to convince his colleagues to 
choose one. Will he be able to impose discipline on the parliament in future 
negotiations with the trans-Dniestrians? 
 
REGIONS 
Cossacks as a wedge in Chechnya? 
The Russian government has proven very Cossack-friendly. Boris Yel'tsin has 
signed a decree establishing a Main Directorate on Cossack Units in the 
presidential administration, which will be responsible for working out policy on the 
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revival of Russia's Cossacks and coordinating the activities of all registered 
Cossack organizations, ITAR-TASS reported on 18 December. (OMRI Daily 
Digest I, No. 244, 19 Dec 96) The president's Main Department for Cossack 
Troops (GUKV) published the first issue of its information bulletin, marking the 
Cossacks' official return to state service, ITAR- TASS reported on 8 January. 
(OMRI Daily Digest I, No. 5, 8 Jan 97) 
 
Later Cossacks began to demand land from Chechnya. Stavropol Krai Cossacks 
rallied on 10 January in several cities to demand the return of territory transferred 
to the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic in 1957 and now part of Chechnya, 
Russian media reported. The area in question includes Naurski and Shelkovski 
raions. Ataman Yuri Churekov said the Cossack Atamans' Council of the Russian 
South supports the territorial demand and is ready to mobilize 100,000 armed 
men to protect Russian-speakers in Chechnya. (OMRI Daily Digest I, No. 9, 14 
Jan 97) 
 
On the surface Cossack demands seem not to have the president's support. 
Addressing a meeting of southern Russian Cossack leaders in Stavropol Krai, 
Deputy Security Council Secretary Boris Berezovskii said that "crude military 
means" could not be used to resolve the Chechen crisis, ITAR-TASS reported. 
He also rejected demands by some Cossack leaders that federal troops occupy 
three northern districts of Chechnya which were transferred to the republic in 
1957, and had large ethnic Russian populations before fighting began in 1994. 
(OMRI Daily Digest I, No. 11, 16 Jan 97) 
 
Further strengthening of center against regions  
The Duma passed in the third and final reading a draft law regulating relations 
between krais, oblasts, and the autonomous okrugs subordinated to them, ITAR-
TASS reported on 18 December. Nine krais and oblasts of the Russian 
Federation contain autonomous okrugs. The bill would make okrugs subject to 
the laws of the corresponding oblast or krai. It stresses that elections to a krai's 
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or oblast's legislative and executive bodies are held throughout all their territories 
without any exception. (OMRI Daily Digest I, No. 244, 19 Dec 96). 
 
Meanwhile a new commission has been created under First Deputy Prime 
Minister Vladimir Potanin to oversee the allocation of federal funds to the regions, 
Segodnya reported on 19 December. Government decree no. 1450 grants the 
commission broad powers to coordinate all federal economic policies that affect 
the regions. (OMRI Daily Digest I, No. 245, 19 Dec 96). 
 
Comment 
The Russian presidency seems to be building up the Cossacks to be a stick with 
which to beat the Chechens. First the presidency takes a much deeper interest in 
controlling then Cossack military and press then calls for cooler heads when the 
Cossacks demand land back from Chechnya. Can Russian 'peace-keepers' be 
far behind? 
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